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breezy, informal writing style. The result
is easy to read and engagingly illustrated.
In addition to the usual reasons to treat
sea stories skeptically, historians have
tended to be wary of them as sources
because of an argument put forward
most prominently by N. A. M. Rodger:
that many of the memoirs published
in the nineteenth century were thinly
disguised political polemics aimed at
ending the practice of impressment
and improving conditions on the lower
deck. In Rodger’s view, historians should
not fall into the trap of perpetuating
the myths of ships as floating jails and
press-gangs running rampant, because
so much of the source material is unreliable. Taylor addresses this view directly
and argues, on the contrary, that most
of the memoirs he uses were published
well after the debates about impressment
and corporal punishment had passed.
By taking sea stories seriously, then,
Taylor has brought together a range of
valuable sources for the social history of
the lower deck. All of Taylor’s memoirs
were readily available to naval historians
before, but his great accomplishment is
to have synthesized their perspectives
in one volume and demonstrated the
value in analyzing them. There is some
irony here, in that Taylor provides
plenty of evidence to support Rodger’s
depiction of the lower deck, despite
using sources that Rodger avoids. But
there is plenty of fuel for alternative
interpretations as well; Taylor repeatedly
shows the social and emotional cost of
impressment, the range of shipboard
disciplinary regimes, and the uncertainties of naval pay and pensions. Taylor
has not settled the debate, but he has
made a useful intervention in it.
A number of points emerge from
Taylor’s retelling of sailors’ experiences.
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The most important is that they were
not victims but rather rational assessors
of the maritime labor market who
sought competent captains and comfortable cruises. That is not to say that they
did not suffer in the age of impressment,
but rather that they did not accept their
fate passively. They voted with their feet,
deserting unhappy ships and volunteering for happy ones. That brought them
into conflict with the Admiralty’s need
to maintain ever-larger naval forces on
ever-more-distant stations, so what held
them together in difficult conditions
was teamwork. Sailors who were pressed
together stayed together—or, in the
words of Robert Hay, one of Taylor’s key
witnesses, “they bec[a]me endeared to
each other by a similarity of sufferings”
(p. 383). Sailors also had a voice, and
Taylor has helped us hear it more clearly.
As Taylor puts it, “One characteristic
stands out above all others in [Jack’s]
storytelling, and it is self-respect” (p. xv).
There was not one singular experience of
life on the lower deck, but the more we
can learn about that experience from the
men themselves, the closer we can get
to understanding their shared experiences. Whether or not all of Taylor’s
sea stories are true, they provide a vivid
account of life at sea in the age of sail.
EVAN WILSON

Putin’s People: How the KGB Took Back Russia
and Then Took On the West, by Catherine Belton. New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 2020. 640
pages. $35.

Catherine Belton’s Putin’s People has
received positive acclaim from most
reviewers, and with good reason. It
is a brave and impressive work of
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investigative journalism, packed with
details about the Russian officials who
assisted Vladimir Putin’s meteoric rise
to power and fascinating insights into
the mechanisms of power in modern
Russia. Belton has made an important
contribution to a broader understanding
of the topic. Nevertheless, scholars
should be judicious with Belton’s claims.
Putin’s People is simultaneously a tour
de force of investigative journalism and
exhibit A in the discussion over the
differences between first-rate journalism
and rigorous historical scholarship.
Belton, an investigative correspondent
for Reuters, has extensive experience in
Russia. She has reported for the Moscow
Times and Business Week, and from 2007
to 2013 was the Moscow correspondent
for the Financial Times; her credentials
in this regard are impeccable. Her book
begins by tracing how KGB officials,
seeing the writing on the wall at the end
of the Cold War, looted Soviet coffers of
funds intended for influence and intelligence operations around the world.
Belton then follows the money and
influence through the Yeltsin period,
exploring how the people around Putin—then a competent but nondescript
bureaucrat—enabled his rise. Once in
power, Putin and his people made use
of their extralegal power structures to
enrich themselves at the expense of the
state and to conduct ostensibly deniable
Kremlin influence operations in Europe
and the United States. Her narrative of
these events is bracing throughout.
Belton’s research is thorough
and meticulous, but her tone is
conspiratorial—a problem that hinders
much writing on Russia—and her
handling of sources is unlikely to pass
muster with professional historians. For
example, intelligence operations clearly
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fascinate her, but she falls for common
cloak-and-dagger tropes. Her opening
chapter on KGB operations in eastern
Europe, where people “disappear off the
grid” and Putin’s activities are “shrouded
in mystery,” is written breathlessly. But
it barely connects the future president
directly to that work, and only once does
she allow for the fact that intelligence
work is characterized largely by mundanity, not drama—a fact that any reader
of John Le Carré or member of an intelligence agency would know all too well.
Belton’s sources sometimes work in
service of her narrative rather than
the opposite, and can fail to meet the
higher standards that professional
historians expect. For example, after
recounting the loss by Putin’s mentor
Anatoly Sobchak of the 1996 Saint
Petersburg mayoral election, Belton
writes that “many believed” the loss
was the result of dirty tricks by people
around Sobchak’s rival Boris Yeltsin.
While such a campaign by Yeltsin was
possible, even likely, Belton’s sources
for this assertion are an interview with
Sobchak’s widow and a documentary
film produced by his daughter—hardly
objective stuff. This occasional combination of ambitious conclusions and weak
sourcing sometimes weighs down the
book’s otherwise interesting arguments
about the nature of power in Russia.
To be fair, Belton is a journalist, an
excellent one, but not a historian.
If the minor dustup over this book
on Twitter between historian Sergey
Radchenko and the Atlantic Council’s
Dylan Primakoff is any indication, this
is a distinction that sometimes is lost
on both professions. As an investigative
journalist, she is writing the proverbial
“first draft of history.” Viewed in these
terms, the book provides an excellent
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set of guideposts for future historians
to explore the power dynamics of
modern Russia, and should be read
alongside scholarly contributions such
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as Brian Taylor’s The Code of Putinism
and Karen Dawisha’s Putin’s Kleptocracy.
MICHAEL B. PETERSEN
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